BHP 1887-2012 * Outside the US, little is known of long-run trends in executive compensation. We fill this gap by studying BHP, a resources giant that has long been one of the largest companies on the Australian stock market. From 1887 to 2013, trends in CEO and director remuneration (relative to average earnings) follow a U-shape. This matches the pattern for US executive compensation, Australian top incomes, and (for the past two decades) average trends in executive compensation in top Australian firms. Like the US, Australia experienced a postwar 'great compression' prior to the recent 'great divergence'.
Introduction
In a 2009 report on executive remuneration, the Productivity Commission (2009, p. 49) noted that from 1993 to 2009, average earnings of ASX100 CEOs rose from $1 million (17 times average earnings) to $3 million (42 times average earnings). According to that report, the top 20 Australian CEOs earn more than 100 times the average wage, with a significant number earning eight-figure salaries.
While little data exists on CEO pay prior to the 1990s (which could lead a casual reader to think that executive salaries have only ever risen) evidence from top incomes suggests otherwise. Using Australian taxation statistics, Atkinson and Leigh (2007) report that the income share of the top 1 percent and top 0.1 percent fell from the 1920s to the 1970s. Over the same period, they also report that High Court Justices, federal members of parliament, and top public servants saw their earnings grow more slowly than the average employee. Yet little is known about executive salaries over the full twentieth century.
In this paper, we fill this gap by looking at mining company BHP Billiton, known until 2001 as Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited companies. For simplicity, we refer to throughout as 'BHP'. Throughout this period, its headquarters have been located in Melbourne, and BHP has been one of the most significant firms in Australia. Its market capitalisation has averaged 13% of Australia's domestic equity market capitalisation from 2002-2012, and reached 15-16% during 2008-2011 . 1 As one of Australia's oldest and largest companies, it has records of executive pay over a suitably long time period to be useful in examining long-run trends in executive pay in a leading Australian company.
1 Based on data on BHP's market capitalisation from Bloomberg Based on BHP Billiton's market capitalisation of $160.6 billion at 30 June 2012, shown in BHP Billiton (2012, p.80) and ASX data on domestic equity market capitalisation at 30 June 2012, shown in Australian Securities Exchange (2013).
We combine data from annual reports, unofficial papers, and data on average Australian earnings to estimate the ratio of director pay to average pay and CEO pay to average pay over a 125-year period. We compare our estimates with analysis on US CEO pay ratios over the long-run, and with estimated top income shares in order to see if a trend similar to that in the US has occurred (with a great compression in inequality in the post-war era, following by an expansion of inequality from the 1980s onwards). We also compare recent BHP data to average trends in executive pay in Australia.
To preview our results, we find that the earnings of those running BHP rose from the 1880s to the 1910s, trended downwards through the 1920s and into the 1930s, rose briefly during
World War II and fell again from the 1940s until the 1980s. Over recent decades, the pay of those running BHP has risen sharply. Our findings suggest a 'great compression' in executive salaries during the post-war era, followed by an expansion again in the late-twentieth century, which matches analysis of US executive salaries from the 1930s to the 2000s by Frydman and Saks (2010) , as well as the broader analysis of compression in the postwar US labour market (Goldin and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 2001; Piketty and Saez 2003) . with Billiton, originally a Dutch firm whose mining interests included lead, tin and bauxite.
Analysing Executive Pay
In this paper, our main focus is on the directors of BHP, and the chief executive (a position described as 'managing director' or 'general manager' during the company's earlier years). (1921 -1949 ), Norman Jones (1950 -1966 ), Sir Ian McLennan (1967 -1970 ), J C McNeil (1971 -1982 ), Brian Loton (1983 -1990 ), John Prescott (1991 -1998 ), Paul Anderson (1999 -2002 ), Brian Gilbertson (2002 ), Chip Goodyear (2003 -2008 ), Marius Kloppers (2009 and
Andrew Mackenzie (2013-).
Our principal source of information is BHP's annual reports. These are available in hard copy for 1887 to 1996, and in electronic form for 1997-2012.
BHP Directors' Earnings
We begin by estimating the ratio of an average BHP director's remuneration to the pay of an average Australian. 2 Using the number of directors listed in BHP annual reports, we constructed a series measuring the average remuneration over the period, relative to observations of average Australian income. 3 Given the multiple changes in tax regimes over the period, we used before-tax pay. This series is shown in Figure 1 below. 
1887-2012
We find that BHP directors remuneration was about twice as much as the average Australian earnings in 1887, but that this quickly rose to 7-10 times average earnings by the 1890s, and stayed at that level into the first decade of the twentieth century. From the early-1910s to the late-1920s, BHP directors' pay fell to as low as four times average earnings, and stayed at about that level through the Great Depression. World War II (in which BHP's steel production played a crucial role) saw directors' salaries rise to around seven times average earnings, before reverting to their 1930s level as soon as the conflict ended.
In the post-war decades, BHP directors' salaries were steadily outpaced by average earnings. 
BHP CEO Earnings
We now turn to the earnings of BHP CEOs. While directors' earnings were reported in the company's annual reports throughout the period in question, executive remuneration has only been reported by BHP since 1987. Prior to this year, therefore, we rely on external sources for CEO earnings. After an extensive search of company papers and history, we have discovered five reported salaries of BHP CEOs, covering the years 1887, 1899, 1903, 1921, and 1926. 5 We make two uses of these reported salaries. First, we plot them directly into Figure 2 . Second, we use each to calculate the ratio of CEO pay to average director pay.
Excluding one outlier, the smallest of these ratios was 4.21 in 1921, and the largest was 7.18 in 1903. 6 Based on accounts of the time, we assumed that as the first chief executive, Mr
Patton remained on £4,000 for 1887-1889. From 1890-1984, we construct a series of the likely range of chief executive earnings based on the minimum and maximum ratios of 4.21 and 7.18. 7 Actual CEO remuneration from 1987-2012 was substantially higher than this 4 These earnings only measure remuneration paid to an average director by BHP, and so was not a limit to the total income than an individual serving as a BHP director could earn. Directors with sources of income other than their work on the BHP board would still have been able to earn more than the average employee. 5 The 1887 figure is from Trengove (1975, p. 16) . The 1899 and 1903 figures are from Osborne (1981) . The 1921 figure is from Blainey and Smith (1986) . The 1926 figure is from Blainey (1971 p. 90) . 6 The excluded outlier is the ratio of 30.34 in 1887, which was due to the atypically large salary paid to Mr. Patton to bring him to the job in Australia from the United States. 7 We estimate this range of likely CEO remuneration up until 1984. Beyond this point, executive director remuneration increases suddenly and substantially, and to the extent that CEO remuneration range (which is not unexpected given the substantial jump in director remuneration in the late 1980s observed in Figure 1 ). As a result, we first show in Figure On the assumption that CEO pay tracked average directors' pay, we estimate that relative BHP CEO remuneration rose again from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s to around 40 times average earnings, before returning to the pre-World War II ratio of around 20 by 1950. From followed a similar trend, the method of estimating the likely range based on director remuneration is highly unlikely to be accurate. 51% from 1960-1984. 9 From 1987-1998, BHP reported remuneration of all executives, but gave ranges rather than specific values and did not identify the CEO. For this period, we have assumed that the highest-paid executive in each of these years was the CEO, and have been conservative in assuming that their remuneration was at the lower bound of the range stated in BHP's reports. Reports for this period do not distinguish between different components of remuneration, so we treat these figures as total remuneration for the purposes of comparison to data from 1999-2012. Note also that as the 1998 observation is an extreme outlier (being approximately $11 million due to the inclusion of severance pay in total remuneration) it is excluded and the ratio for 1998 is instead calculated as the average of the 1997 and 1999 values. 10 The total remuneration reported in annual reports is based on the cash salary as well as the estimated values of non-cash remuneration in the form of incentives such as share options (an example of one common method for valuing stock options is through the use of the Black-Sholes pricing model). There is no guarantee of the accuracy of the estimates reported in the BHP annual reports. Valuation of share options, for example, may not accurately forecast the options' realised value. For more on this, and on reasons why such estimates may over-or under-estimate the realised value, see Productivity Commission (2009, pp. 45-7) . For an example of BHP's methods for valuing incentives, see BHP Billiton (2012, pp. 149-156) .
(including only salary and bonuses), (b) cash and benefits, and (c) total remuneration (which includes long-term incentives).
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In Figure 3 , these recent figures show a significant rise in the pay of BHP's CEO relative to the average Australian income. By the late-1980s, total CEO remuneration had returned to the ratio not seen since the start of the twentieth century, at or above 50 times average earnings. This rose to around 75 times average earnings by 1999. In the twenty-first century, when measuring cash remuneration only, CEO pay has fluctuated around this ratio. When incorporating benefits, the ratio has ranged from 100 to 150, and including long-term incentives shows CEO in this period range from 150 to 250 times average earnings. By any of these measures, the ratio of CEO remuneration to average earnings has exceeded the highest ratios previously seen at the beginning of the twentieth century). 12 Mining gross value added is the chain volume measure from Table 5 of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012) . BHP AU Equity share price data and market capitalisation are from Bloomberg. 13 While the ABS uses an industry-specific deflator to calculate the mining sector's gross value added, comparing this to the CPI-adjusted remuneration is appropriate in terms of comparing the purchasing power of remuneration to growth in the real value of output specific to the mining industry. Deflating mining output by CPI shows total remuneration increased on average 5.07% per year faster than mining output, while cash remuneration grew on average 2.42% per year slower than mining output.
Figure 5: Indices of CPI-adjusted value of BHP CEO total remuneration (1987 = 100) and cash remuneration (2000 = 100), compared to the gross value added of the Australian mining sector (1987= 100).
CEO remuneration also grew faster than average incomes in the mining sector as a whole. Australian earnings at BHP increased from 2.76 to 6.10 (an increase of 221%), while average director remuneration in the top 100 companies rose from 1.02 to 3.59 times average earnings (an increase of 352%). Thus while BHP directors were remunerated better than the average for the top 100 firms, their pay grew slightly more slowly over this period, albeit from a higher base. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests that the increase in BHP director remuneration is not uncharacteristic of trends in Australia as a whole.
Figure 7: Average remuneration of top five non-executive directors excluding the chair, (relative to average Australian earnings), 1988-2012
We then perform a similar comparison for CEO pay. Australian companies (both relative to average earnings), 1988-2012 Because the analysis in Figure 8 focuses only on cash salaries and bonuses, the BHP pay ratio is between 40 and 120 times average earnings (recall that the total remuneration measure in Figure 9 plots the average income of a BHP director as a ratio of the minimum incomes required to enter the top 1 percent and 0.5 percent of Australian income earners, as estimated by Atkinson and Leigh (2007) , from 1922-2011. 15 For most of the 1930s and 1940s, the average income of a BHP director increased sufficiently to see them retain an income equal to or greater than that required to enter the top 1 percent, and even break through into the top 0.5 percent. A particularly striking change that we observe is the changes in pay ratios from 1978 (when,
Comparison with top incomes
as Figure 1 showed, a BHP director was paid almost exactly the same as an average worker)
to 2012 (when a BHP director was paid enough to comfortably put them into the top 0.5 percent). It is possible that such a shift was accompanied by some reduction in other sources of income garnered by directors (e.g. perhaps BHP directors served on fewer boards in 2012 than 1978), but the change is so large that it is hard to see how other factors could offset it and, given the similar growth in director remuneration across Australia's top 100 companies (see Figure 6 ), it seems likely that this is representative of a broader increase in inequality between average workers and company directors.
Moving from directors to CEOs, Figure 10 plots BHP CEO income as a ratio of the minimum income required to enter the top 0.1 percent of Australian income earners, as estimated by Atkinson and Leigh (2007) To answer this alternative question, in Figure 11 we plot the ratio of BHP CEO pay to average Australian earnings, and the share of total household income earned by the 0.1 percent of Australians, as estimated by Atkinson and Leigh (2007) . Both series are U-shaped, and follow a similar downward trend from the 1950s to 1970s. However, the modern-day rise in BHP CEO pay is much greater than the increase in the income share of the top 0.1 percent.
One way to see this is to compare the 2000s with the 1920s. While the income share of the top 0.1 percent of income earners in Australia by the end of 2011 was a little lower than the mid-1920s peak of around 4%, BHP CEO remuneration was far higher than it had been at any point in the firm's history. 
Comparison with Frydman-Saks data on remuneration of top US executives
Finally, we look at how the gap between executive pay and average pay in Australia compares with the United States. In Figure 12 , we plot our estimates alongside the ratio of Comparing trends in BHP executive pay with pay in the top 100 Australian firms (available since the late-1980s), we find quite similar patterns. The same is true when we compare our BHP executive pay series with remuneration in the top 50 US firms (available since the early1940s). We also analyse top incomes data (available since the early-1920s), and find that while both executive pay ratios and top income shares follow a U-shaped pattern, the recent rise in Australian executive pay has outpaced the rise in top income shares.
What explains these trends? Given the commonality between BHP executive salaries and those in the broader Australian corporate sector (and indeed, the US corporate sector), explanations must go beyond those that affect BHP alone. The rise in BHP CEO salaries predates the twenty-first century mining boom, and outstrips growth in average mining sector value-added. And while total remuneration closely tracks the BHP share price (as is to be expected given the dependence on long-term incentives on the value of the company's stocks), changes in cash remuneration cannot be fully explained by variation in BHP's share price.
In our view, three explanations account for most of the growth in Australian executive pay.
First, our largest firms have grown larger, so CEOs and directors end up being paid more to take on greater responsibility. In effect, mergers increase remuneration at the top of a firm, but not for the average employee. Evidence from the US shows this link between pay and firm size quite clearly, while Australian studies have noted similar trends in firm size (Gabaix and Landier 2008) . For example, from 1987 to 2007, the top 20 firms grew more than twice as fast as the rest of the Australian share market (Productivity Commission 2009, p. 56) . This explanation would also account for the substantial growth in BHP CEO remuneration (whether measured as cash or total remuneration) relative to growth in average incomes in the mining sector overall.
Second, as the market for English-speaking executives has become more integrated, and recruitment panels have sought out international expertise, salaries in Australia have been benchmarked against those in the United States. The labour market integration effect can be seen in the fact that top income shares have risen faster in English-speaking countries than in non-English speaking countries, and that in Canada, top incomes have risen more slowly in the French-speaking province of Quebec (Leigh 2013; Saez and Vaell 2005) . The clearly stated intention of BHP in 1999 that they were seeking 'world class' experience and the subsequent jump in remuneration suggests that was a contributing factor in the more recent rapid increase in CEO remuneration -one which is reflected in trends in Australian executive pay in general.
Third, Board committees have played a part in boosting top income shares. While firms have looked in many places for savings, they have traditionally been reluctant to reduce costs by hiring a cheap CEO. In a 2009 survey, firms were asked how much they would be prepared to pay for a CEO. About 45 percent of firms said they would pay above-median, about 50 percent would pay the median, and about 5 percent would pay below-median (Peetz 2010) .
Even absent such a 'Lake Wobegon effect', remuneration committees have tended to take the view that increased incentive payments make it necessary for firms to raise base remuneration, and less job security makes it necessary for firms to increase severance payouts. Again, these shifts have acted to boost total CEO pay.
